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 With as much importance as Foreign Direct Investment, an enormous amount of 
study on the factors which might hamper Foreign Direct Investment has been done with a 
lot of research. Also, the impact of a crisis on FDI has been especially appealing due to 
the recent economic depression. However, the literature about the linkage between one of 
the crises, a banking crisis and FDI is sparse even though a banking crisis is highly 
correlated with the overall economy’s damage. With data collected for 60 countries for 
the years 1990-2010, this paper examines the relationship between Foreign Direct 
Investment and a banking crisis in addition to the linkage between a banking crisis and 
domestic investment. The pooled ordinary least squares is used for the first empirical 
method. The lagged investment is done for robustness and the fixed effects is used to 
check a final robustness. The results indicate that banking crisis is highly correlated with 
domestic investment rate while the lagged value of banking crisis does not seem to have 
any significant impact.  However, the results with fixed effects show that the lagged 
effect of banking crisis has a large impact on investment while the banking crisis 
variables turn out to be not correlated with investment.  For FDI, both the banking crisis 
and the lagged value of banking crisis do not show any significance in all specifications.  
From a policy perspective, these results suggest that building up the strength of the 
banking sector is critical to protect domestic economies. Meanwhile it is not an important 
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  Foreign Direct Investment plays a critical role in accelerating the economic 
growth of host countries. The vast majority of the world’s developing countries eagerly 
seek FDI because it boosts economic growth by (1) augmenting domestic savings and 
investment, (2) helping transfer of technology from the home country, (3) boosting 
competition in the host domestic market, (4) increasing exports and earning foreign 
exchange, and (5) imparting several other types of positive externalities to the economy 
at large (Ram and Zhang(2002).  However, even with continuous attempts by 
developing countries to attract FDI, there have been some concerns that cause 
multinational corporations to hesitate when investing.  There has been an enormous 
amount of study on the matter, but the relationship between FDI and a crisis has been 
appealing due to the recent economic depression.  
  A banking crisis is a financial crisis associated with banking activity.  It happens 
when a large number of withdrawals occur at the same time from a financial institution.  
It can be detrimental to an overall economy since financial institutions become insolvent 
as a bank run progresses.  Many times bank runs result in a recession so the link 
between FDI and banking crisis should be dealt with more often. 
  This paper examines the relationship between Foreign Direct Investment and a 
banking crisis in addition to the linkage between a banking crisis and domestic 
investment.  The pooled ordinary least squares is used for the first empirical method.  
The lagged investment is done for robustness and the fixed effects is used to check a 
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final robustness.  The results indicate that banking crisis is highly correlated with 
domestic investment rate while the lagged value of banking crisis does not seem to have 
any significant impact.  However, the results with fixed effects show that the lagged 
effect of banking crisis has a large impact on investment while the banking crisis 
variables turn out to be not correlated with investment.  For FDI, both the banking crisis 
and the lagged value of banking crisis do not show any significance in all specifications.  
From a policy perspective, these results suggest that building up the strength of the 
banking sector is critical to protect domestic economies meanwhile it is not an important 
determinant to attract and host FDI.  
  This paper consists of 5 sections.  Section 1.1 provides an overview of banking 
crisis. Section 2 reviews the related literatures.  Section 3 describes the data.  Section 4 
presents the empirical models and analysis methodology adopted and results.  Section 5 
summarizes the conclusion of the work and gives the possible discussion. 
 
1.1 Banking Crises: An overview 
 
 A banking crisis is a financial crisis related to banking activity. It consists of three 
levels of crises; bank runs, bank panics and systemic banking crises. A bank run occurs 
when a huge number of customers withdraw their deposits under a belief that the 
financial institution is or might be insolvent. This belief triggered the momentum that 
boosts more people to withdraw their deposits, which cause further withdrawals. As more 
financial institutions are involved, it becomes a bank panic and a systemic banking crisis 
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when the majority of reserve banking system loses their capita.   
As almost all of the bank’s resources are depleted due to a banking crisis, the 
overall economy soon confronts a recession which in many cases causes much of a 
recession’s damage. Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) described that banking crisis reduces 
output and employment sharply.  Their sample shows that the cumulative decline in real 
asset prices decrease from max to min by about 35.5% and continues to do so for about 
six years following the impending banking crisis. The decline in equity prices if more 
noticeable with an average of 55.9%, but this fall is over a shorter period of time than that 
of the real estate prices. For the most part, unemployment rises over a five year period by 
about seven percentage points. Decreases in output per capita have an average magnitude 
of 9.3% while the declines in output last for about two years. In addition to this, 
whenever there is a banking crisis, real government debt also rises following that event. 
Due to increases in government spending and a decrease in revenues from taxes, in the 








2. Literature Review  
 
 Mishkin(1999) stated that banks are the only source of lending for many 
buisnesses and play an important role in overcoming adverse selection and moral hazard 
problems in credit markets. Thus, whenever bank lending collapses, so will the economy. 
Barro (2001) reported that currency and banking crisis reduces economic growth by 3 % 
per year for the 1997-98 crises in five East Asian countries.  Also Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2009) reported in their paper that banking crises are associated with substantial declines 
in output and employment. The unemployment rate raises an average of 7 percentage 
points over the down phase of the cycle, which lasts on average over four years. Output 
falls an average of over 9 percent, although the duration of the downturn is considerably 
shorter than for unemployment. (this part needs to be changed into my version) 
 The results described in Joyce and Nabar (2006) seem to be consistent with these 
negative impacts of banking.  They have investigated the effect of external crises 
combined with banking crises on investment.  Their results show that the external crises 
lower investment by 1.27 of a percentage of GDP in the short-term and 3.33 percentage 
points in the long-run.  This impact takes place even when the impact of past growth and 
other standard determinants of investments are considered.  They also find that banking 
crises lower the investment share of GDP by 1.1 percentage points in the short term and 
2.89 percentage points in the long-run.  This suggests that fragility in the banking sector 
can worsen the impact of an external sector crisis.   
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 Due to the lack of research on the linkage between a banking crisis and Foreign 
Direct Investment, it is hard to find out if there is any relationship between them.  
However, since a financial crisis includes and is highly associated with banking panics as 
we can see from a lot of cases in the 19th and early 20th centuries, the papers about the 
relationship between a financial crisis and FDI are reviewed instead.  In a lot of papers, it 
is demonstrated that FDI flows do not get affected much by financial crises.  
Lipsey(2001) derived the same results that inflows of direct investments have been more 
stable than portfolio or other forms of capital flows in response to economic crises.  
When focusing on the U.S. affiliates, they seemed to handle the crisis well by changing 
host-country sales to export sales.  Besides, throughout the samples, these affiliates 
maintained relatively stable employment rate.  Edward et al.(2000) specifically focuses 
on Mexico’s case and argued that although there was an evidence of the aggregate 
withdrawal of liquid funds from Mexico at the time of the crisis of 1995, for technical 
reasons, this withdrawal does not seem to be associated with the FDI data per se.  It is 
demonstrated that while owners’ equity, which indicates approximately the stock of FDI, 
continued to grow in years following the crisis, there was a dip on the quantities of 
current assets of foreign-controlled affiliates, which reflects the liquid component of 
assets of these affiliates.  
 Edmund R. Thompson et al. (2000) explains the reasons of this phenomenon: the 
first reason why this can be explained is FDI by MNCs is relatively long-term unlike 
other forms of financial flows.  For instance, some industries such as green-field 
production facilities require either more or less fixed investment.  Secondly, it is hard to 
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stop investing for some networks like acquired factories and organically grown or 
purchased supply and distribution networks.  It is mainly because it takes time to build 
them up and there will be a lot of sunk costs for them. Lastly, the authors argue that crises 
can attract more investment which might hold a stable investment level.  There has been 
significant correlation found for European and U.S. MNCs between crisis-induced reform 
expectations and anticipations of the ASEAN region becoming a more attractive sales and 
production investment region. Their arguments seem pretty plausible and thus boost the 














 The data for 60 countries
1  
for the years 1990-2010 is collected to provide a 
comprehensive evaluation of the linkage between a systemic banking crisis and 
investment especially Foreign Direct Investment in this paper.  The dataset includes 
Foreign Direct Investment inflows, gross capital formation (formerly gross domestic 
investment), a banking crisis dummy variable, market capitalization, economic freedom 
and GDP per capita
2
.  To test the effect of the banking crisis which might persist beyond 
the first year, the lagged values of a banking crisis is created.  In addition, the lagged 
investment variables are generated for robustness.   
 For the main dependent variable, the share of Foreign Direct Investment inflows 
in GDP is taken rather than FDI itself to adjust the level of FDI for the size of the 
country’s economy.  This action is taken for two reasons.  Firstly, it is useful for a more 
direct comparison between countries.  For instance, it seems unreasonable to compare the 
amount of FDI inflows in the US versus that of South Korea because of their dramatic 
differences in the size of their economies.  Second, it is likely that a country’s GDP is 
associated with the amount of FDI the country receives.  To put it simply, a larger 
economy tends to have more chances for investment.  Thus, this transformation will help 
to avoid the problem of endogeneity when taking the market size into account.   
 Data for FDI inflows is collected from UNCTAD, and the nominal GDP is from 
                                                 
1
 A complete list of countries is provided in Table 1 
2
 A summary of the variables is provided in Table 2. 
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World DataBank. FDI inflows and outflows are made up of capital provided by an 
investor to a FDI enterprise. This transaction can either be made directly or indirectly. 
Firstly, included in FDI is equity capital. This is the foreign investor’s purchase of shares 
in an enterprise other than that in their country of residency. The second thing is that 
reinvested earnings are also included in FDI. These reinvested earnings are composed of 
direct investor’s shares of an enterprise in a country other than that of their residency. 
The last portion is the intra-company loans. These loans are short or long-term borrowing 
of funds/capital between direct investors and associated enterprises. Data on FDI are 
given on net bases. Net decreases in assets or net increases in credits are recorded as 
credits, while the opposite of such is recorded as a debit. Thus, a negative FDI flow 
(negative sign) indicates that at least one of its components are negative and is not offset 
by a positive amount in the other components. All of these factors are called reverse 
investment or disinvestment.  
 The second dependent variable is gross capital formation (formerly gross 
domestic investment) a share of GDP collected from World DataBank.  Gross capital 
formation is made of additions to the fixed assets of the economy added to net changes in 
the level of inventories. Included in the fixed assets are land improvements, machinery, 
plant, equipment purchases, and commercial industrial buildings. Inventories on the other 
hand consist of the amount of goods held by corporations to meet temporary or 
unexpected changes in production, sales, and works in progress. According to the 1993 
SNA, considered in the capital formation GDP are the net acquisitions of valuables 
(Gross Value of all resident producers plus product taxes minus subsidies not included in 
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value). This calculation is made without making deductions for depreciation of assets or 
for the use of natural resources.  
 The banking crisis database utilized in this paper comes from the paper, Systemic 
Banking Crises Database by Laeven and Valenicia (2012). According to them, a banking 
crisis is regarded as systemic if (1) the banking system shows significant signs of bank 
distress, and (2) significant losses in the banking system has brought significant policy 
intervention.  The year that meets both phenomena is considered as the first year of a 
systemic banking crisis.  The end year is determined to be the year prior to at least two 
consecutive years of positive real credit and real GDP growth.  They identify 147 
banking crises over the period 1970- 2011 in their paper.  However, due to the 
availability of other variables taken for this paper, the period of time examined is 
narrowed from 1990 to 2010.  The final set of banking crises consists of 49 episodes in 
42 countries
3
.  A list of those countries along with the start and end years of the systemic 
banking crisis is provided in table 3.   
 Data for market capitalization, also known as market value, is pulled from World 
Databank.  It is measured by the share price multiplied by the number of outstanding 
shares of domestically incorporated companies which are listed on the country’s stock 
exchanges at the end of year.  However, these companies exclude investment companies, 
mutual funds, or other collective investment vehicles.  Data for economic freedom is 
                                                 
3
 A list of countries with banking crises used in this paper is provided in Table 3.  There are some 
countries that had banking crises starting before 1990 but persisted afterward.  To provide the 
complete information, the start years for these countries are presented even though this paper only 




.  The components of the Economic Freedom of the world 
index are 1) size of government and taxation, 2) private property and the rule of law, 3) 
soundness of money, 4) trade regulation and tariffs and 5) regulation of business, labor 
and capital markets.  The sum of these components is used in this paper.  GDP per capita 
is gross domestic product divided by midyear population and data used for this paper is 











                                                 
4
 Updated and revised as of Oct 23, 2012. (http://www.freetheworld.com) 
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4. Empirical Models and Results 
 
 In this section, we use several different empirical specifications to assess how 
banking crises impact capital accumulation. In particular, we first look at whether a 
banking crisis retards capital accumulation.  As our measure of capital accumulation, we 
use investment rates defined as investment’s share of GDP.  We find evidence there is a 
negative (partial) correlation between banking crisis and investment rates. These findings 
are robust across many different specifications.  We then look to see if foreign direct 
investment (FDI) is impacted by a banking crisis.  There is no evidence found that there 
is an impact of a banking crisis on FDI flows. 
 The empirical approach to the first three models uses the pooled ordinary least 
squares.  This specification will yield consistent estimates as long as we have controlled 
variables for all important (relevant) country specific variables. We included the lags of 
the investment rates for robustness.  In the event, the results are subject to an omitted 
variable bias, we specify a fourth model that includes country specific fixed effects.  
 
4.1 Does A Banking Crisis Reduce Domestic Investment? 
  
 The first model focuses on the correlation between the incidence of a systemic 
banking crisis and gross capital formation.  In particular, our baseline specification is  
         
 12 
                                       !/Y= β0 + β1 Bank Crisis X1 + β2ZX2 + ε                               (1.1) 
 
where, !/Y stands investment’s share of GDP.  The independent variables include a 
dummy that takes on the value of unit if the country is in a banking crisis and zero 
otherwise, and Z includes a set of control variables.  Among the set of controls, we 
include market capitalization as a share of GDP, economic freedom, GDP per capita, and 
year dummies that capture systemic shocks that impact all countries.  We will use these 
controls throughout the paper.  
 Banking crises are typically associated with recessions, and we know that 
investment is more volatile than GDP. Therefore, we would expect to see a decline in 
investment rates associated with the presence of a banking crisis.  In addition, a banking 
crisis can make it more difficult to obtain funds to finance investment projects and this 
will also tend to lower investments. These considerations lead us to the first hypothesis of 
the paper: 
 
Hypothesis: We expect a negative correlation between investment rates and the banking 
crisis dummy. 
 
 In Table 4.1 column (1), we regress investment rates on the banking crisis dummy.  
Consistent with our hypothesis we find a negative correlation between investment rates 
and the banking crisis dummy.  In addition, we find that after controlling for several other 
country effects, the impact of banking crises on investment rates does not change much 
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qualitatively or quantitatively.  It remains very significant and steady ranging from 2.30% 
- 2.81 %.  It may be the case that the negative correlation is not associated with a banking 
crisis, but there may be some omitted variable that is correlated with banking crises and 
investment rates.  The sign of the other controls are as expected. The market 
capitalization variable has a positive impact on investment, but they do not show much 
significance throughout all the columns. GDP per capita variables show that they decline 
the investment rate although this explanation can be ignored due to its insignificance. 
 In Table 4.2, we include the lagged values of investment that may pick up some of 
the dynamic aspect of the model that were not captured in the baseline specifications:  
       
                          !/Y= β0 + β1Bank CrisisX1 + β2 L.Investment X2 + β3Z3 + ε.               (1.2) 
 
We would expect that investment is pretty persistent over time; however, investment is 
substantially more volatile than GDP so we would expect the coefficient on lagged 
investment rates to be less than unity.  The results in all five columns in Table 4.2 are 
consistent with this.  We find that presence of a banking crisis is still negatively 
correlated with the contemporaneous investment rates. However, the point estimates of 
the impact of a banking crisis become weaker—in the range of 1.27 - 1.41 % compared to 
2.30 – 2.81 % from the one in table 4.1.   This table indicates that a banking crisis will 
impact future investment rates through the lagged investment rates.  For example using 
the estimates in Table 4.2 column 1, suppose in the long run investment rate is 0.20 and 
in the current period there is a banking crisis.  If the impact of a banking crisis lowers 
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investment rates by 0.0136 percentage points, then contemporaneous investment would 
fall to 0.186.  If there were no banking crises in subsequent periods and all other 
economic variables remained constant, investment the year after the banking crisis would 
be about 0.192 (= 0.878*(0.186)+0.0284) 
  To investigate if there are additional dynamic effects we include a lagged value of 
the banking crises dummy:       
 
          !/Y= β0 + β1 Bank Crisis X1 + β2 L. Bank Crisis X2 + β3 L. Investment X3 + β4Z4 + ε.      (1.3) 
 
It is likely that investors will consider the banking crisis in the last term as an obstacle of 
its overall economy to the current term and thus lower their investment.  However, the 
addition of the lagged dummy variable of a banking crisis is not statistically significant in 
most of the specifications. It may seem surprising that the lagged effect of a banking 
crisis does not seem to be associated with investment.  However, recall the inclusion of 
the lagged investment share will introduce dynamic effects of a banking crisis. 
 
4.1.1 Robustness check  
 
 To check a final robustness, we will apply the fixed effects to the model 1.3 and 
compare the results.  By using this method, it will allow us to capture time-invariant 
effects which might be legal system or the shares of different industries.   
 
 15 
                            !/Y= β0 + β1 Bank Crisis X1 + β2 L. Bank Crisis X2 + β3Z4 + ε.                    (1.3.1) 
  
The results in table 4.3.1 show very interesting results.  Applying the fixed effects makes 
the lagged value of banking crisis becomes very significant unlike the previous results.  It 
shows that the lagged effect of banking crisis will bring falls in investment rate ranging 
of 1.48 – 2.28 %.  Meanwhile, the banking crisis variable turns out to be insignificant.  It 
still keeps its negative sign which is consistent with the previous results.   
 
4.2 Do Banking Crises Discourage Foreign Direct Investment? 
 
 While we found the domestic investment rates typically declined following a 
banking crisis, it is not clear how a banking crisis will impact foreign direct investment. 
If a country has a banking crisis it may indicate that the potential destination country is 
too risky and FDI will decline. On the other hand, that banking crises have little to no 
impact on FDI. This could be the case because the credit issues associated with domestic 
credit may not impact foreign investment flows.  In addition, if the source country 
perceives the impact of the banking crisis as a temporary disruption in the destination 
economy, it may not discourage FDI.  We do not have a data that would allow us to sort 
out these competing effects, instead we use the same empirical approach as above to 
assess the strength of these effects. 
 
Hypothesis 2: If FDI declines in response to a banking crisis, it would be consistent with 
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the theory that the presence of a banking crisis makes a country look more risky and less 
attractive for FDI flows.  Alternatively, if there is no affect it would be consistent with the 
story that the shocks are generally perceived to be temporary and the source country not 
being as credit constrained as the domestic market.   
 
 There may be alternative theories that would be consistent with the empirical 
results, but these two stories seem the most plausible.  
 Similar to the above model, we specify FDI as a share of GDP and regress this on 
the banking crisis dummy and a set of country and time controls.  The first model is built 
to focus on the linkage between a banking crisis and its impact on FDI: 
  
                                          FDI/Y= β0 + β1 Bank CrisisX1 + β2 ZX2 + ε                         (1.4) 
 
FDI/Y is the share of Foreign Direct Investment inflows in GDP, and Bank Crisis is a 
banking crisis dummy.  Z incorporates market capita value as a share of GDP, economic 
freedom, the share of domestic investment in GDP, GDP per capita and year dummies as 
the control terms.  These control variables will remain the same for all the models in this 
section. 
 Table 4.4 shows there seems to be little to no impact of a banking crisis on FDI.  
The estimates are small and imprecisely measured.  The other controls all have their 
expected sign.  Having a higher level of economic freedom seems beneficial for FDI as 
shown in column 3 and 4, but does not show much significance when GDP per capita is 
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included.  At first glance, the level of domestic investment rate seems to have a close 
relationship with FDI, but the results show it does not have any significant effect at all 
while it keeps the positive sign.  The expected sign of GDP per capita is positive while it 
does not show a significant level.   
 
                       FDI/Y= β0 + β1 Bank Crisis X1 + β2 L.FDI X2 + β3Z3 + ε.                      (1.5) 
 
 Table 4.5 presents the results with the lagged value of FDI. It is apparent that 
having the lagged effect of FDI brings a positive impact on the current period.  Its impact 
decreases slightly as other control variables are included.  Throughout all the columns, 
the results show that the banking crisis variable does not have much impact on FDI flows.  
Its sign is negative when the effect of other control terms is not considered in column 1, 
but its sign shows that it will increase FDI inflows in the rest of the columns.  The 
coefficient of the market capitalization variable declines, but it still maintains 1% 
significance level except for the one result within year fixed effect.  The economic 
freedom variables show 5% significance level in column 3 and 4, but turns out to be 
insignificant with the impact of the GDP per capita variable.  The domestic investment 
and GDP per capita variables still show a positive sign, but both maintain low 
significance.  
 The third set of the models is set to measure the possible effect of a banking crisis 
which might persist beyond the first year: 
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               FDI/Y= β0 + β1 Bank Crisis X1 + β2 L.Bank Crisis X2 + β3 L. FDI X3 + β4Z4 + ε.       (1.6) 
  
 Table 4.6 has added the expected effect of having a bank crisis in the prior year.  
Its signs show that its effect causes falls in investment, but it does not show any 
significance.  Meanwhile, the lagged value of FDI remains very significant ranging from 
0.29 – 0.36 % which is almost the same level as the findings in table 4.5.  The sign of the 
banking crisis variable still continues to be positive, yet it is insignificant.  All the control 
variables shows a very similar result as table 4.5 which suggests that having the lagged 
effect of banking crisis does not influence on other control aspects. 
 
4.2.1 Robustness check  
  
                      FDI/Y= β0 + β1 Bank Crisis X1 + β2 L.Bank Crisis X2 + β3Z4 + ε                      (1.6.1) 
  
 The results in table 4.6.1 show that having both the effect of banking crisis this 
year and the lagged effect of banking crisis seem to have insignificant impact on FDI 
flows as the same as the previous results.  The banking crisis variables have mostly 
positive sign throughout the columns, but do not show any significance.  The lagged 
effect of banking crisis keeps a negative sign except for the results with year fixed effect.  
The market capita value variables show a high level of significance throughout all of the 
columns even after including year fixed effect.  The impact of domestic investment 
appears to have a positive impact yet its sign still remains insignificant. 
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5. Conclusion and Discussion 
 
  The purpose of this study was to assess how banking crises impact capital 
accumulation.  Firstly, investment rates defined as investment’s share of GDP was used as 
one of the capital accumulations.  Secondly, we looked at Foreign Direct Investment as 
another form of capital accumulation.  The pooled ordinary least squares is used for the fi
rst empirical method.  The lagged investment is done for robustness and the fixed effects 
is used to check a final robustness. 
 In many specifications, the results are consistent with the hypothesis that there is a 
negative correlation between investment rates and the banking crisis.  The results derived 
from the pooled method show that there is a negative impact of banking crisis on 
domestic investment rates.  The impact of crisis seems to decrease when the lagged effect 
of investment is included, and slightly increase when both the lag value of a banking 
crisis and investment are included.  One possible explanation can be that the effect of 
banking crisis tends to become weaker in the countries where the effect of investment last 
year is still ongoing.  Moreover, having a crisis in addition to the one in the previous term 
will cause more damage which will eventually lead to a higher impact of a banking crisis 
this year.  However, surprisingly, the lagged dummy variable of a crisis is not statistically 
significant in most of the specifications and the coefficients on the other variables do not 
seem to have much of an impact at all.  This may be explained with the idea that the 
inclusion of the lagged investment share will cause dynamic effects of a banking crisis. 
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Overall, with the lagged investment, the effect of the banking crisis will have persistent ef
fects due to the lag of investment share. However, after fixed effects is included, the 
results seem very different.  The banking crisis does not seem to have any impact on 
investment while it still keeps a negative sign.  Instead, the lags effect of banking crisis 
becomes very significant.  
 It is found out that a banking crisis is not correlated with FDI.  This can be 
interpreted with one of the hypotheses that shocks are generally perceived to be 
temporary and the source country not being as credit constrained as the domestic market.  
Just like the results for domestic investment, even after including the lagged investment 
for robustness,   the banking crisis will have persistent effects.  In addition, even after 
including the fixed effect for a final robustness check, the banking crisis variables still do 
not seem to have any significance.  There shows little evidence that having an incidence 
of banking crisis last year has an impact on foreign direct investment.  The interesting 
finding for the control variable is that domestic investment rate is not correlated with FDI 
inflows while it keeps its positive sign throughout all the regressions.  
 There can be multiple reasons to keep FDI from being directly affected by host 
countries’ banking system.  One of the possible reasons can be that domestic investment 
is more influenced by domestic banking system when compared to FDI.  This is because 
multinational corporations investing in host countries also can get help from their home 
countries when crises occur.  The second reason can be Foreign Direct Investment tends 
to be relatively long-term as Edmund R. Thompson et al. (2000) reported.  For instance, 
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the industries foreign investors invest into tend to require a more fixed investment.  
Besides, it takes times to build up those industries and there will be a lot of sunk costs for 
them which are not easily ignored.  Lastly, they argue that crises can attract more 
investment which might hold a stable investment level.  There has been significant 
correlation found for European and U.S. MNCs between crisis-induced reform 
expectations and anticipations of the ASEAN region becoming a more attractive sales and 
production investment region.  From the policy perspective, it is believed that building up 
the strength of the banking sector is critical to protect domestic economies while it is not 














Appendix A   Figures 
 









Figure 1.3: Domestic Investment VS. FDI in Sweden (The banking crisis of 1991 -1995,  
 1998- ongoing) 
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Appendix B  Tables 
Table 1: Country List 
Argentina Kenya 











Costa Rica Panama 




Egypt, Arab Rep. South Africa 
Finland Spain 





India Trinidad and Tobago 
Indonesia Tunisia 
Israel Turkey 
Italy United Kingdom 
Japan United States 











Table 2: Summary of the Variables 
Variable Observation Mean Standard Error Min Max 
FDI(% of GDP) 1248 .032497 .0503784 -.550655 .7483171 
Gross Capital Formation 
(% of GDP) 
1237 .225818 .0567957 .066888 .4824343 
Bank Crisis 1260 .1222222 .3276723 0 1 
Market Capitalization 
(% of GDP) 
1242 56.46362 55.21795 .5349585 328.8763 
Economic Freedom 1239 6.854431 1.012598 3.52 8.88 













Argentina 1989 1991 Kenya 1992 1994 
Argentina 1995 1995 Korea 1997 1998 
Argentina 2001 2003 Luxembourg 2008 ongoing 
Austria 2008 ongoing Malaysia 1997 1999 
Belgium 2008 ongoing Mexico 1994 1996 
Brazil 1990 1994 Netherlands 2008 ongoing 
Brazil 1994 1998 Nigeria 1991 1995 
China, Mainland 1998 1998 Nigeria 2009 ongoing 
Colombia 1998 2000 Norway 1991 1993 
Costa Rica 1987 1991 Philippines 1997 2001 
Costa Rica 1994 1995 Portugal 2008 ongoing 
Cote d'Ivoire 1988 1992 Spain 2008 ongoing 
Denmark 2008 ongoing Sri Lanka 1989 1991 
Ecuador 1998 2002 Swaziland 1995 1999% 
Finland 1991 1995 Sweden 1991 1995 
France 2008 ongoing Sweden 2008 ongoing 
Germany 2008 ongoing Switzerland 2008 ongoing 
Greece 2008 ongoing Thailand 1997 2000 
Hungary 1991 1995 Togo 1993 1994 
Hungary 2008 ongoing Tunisia 1991 1991 
India 1993 1993 Turkey 2000 2001 
Indonesia 1997 2001 United Kingdom 2007 ongoing 
Italy 2008 ongoing United States 2007 ongoing 
Japan 1997 2001 Venezuela 1994 1998 









Table 4.1: Model 1.1: Domestic Investment 

































  (0.0000288) (0.0000344) (0.0000342) (0.0000351) 
econfree_i   -0.00195 0.00471 0.00607
*
 
   (0.00197) (0.00249) (0.00255) 

















 (0.00170) (0.00240) (0.0128) (0.0155) (0.0170) 
Year No No No No Yes 
N 1237 1219 1201 1200 1200 
R
2
 0.026 0.030 0.029 0.044 0.074 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***











Table 4.2: Model 1.2: Domestic Investment_Including The lagged value of Investment 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***








































 (0.00227) (0.00230) (0.00234) (0.00237) (0.00234) 







  (0.0000132) (0.0000157) (0.0000157) (0.0000154) 
econfree_i   -0.00219
*
 -0.000713 -0.00129 
   (0.000928) (0.00118) (0.00115) 
lnrgdppc    -0.00206
*
 -0.00174 












 (0.00307) (0.00315) (0.00678) (0.00801) (0.00829) 
Year No No No No Yes 
N 1178 1168 1151 1150 1150 
R
2





Table 4.3: Model 1.3: Domestic Investment_Including The lagged value of Banking Crisis 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***







































 (0.00324) (0.00328) (0.00332) (0.00333) (0.00330) 
L.bank_crisis 0.00211 0.00229 0.00103 0.00110 0.00770
*
 
 (0.00337) (0.00340) (0.00347) (0.00345) (0.00341) 







  (0.0000132) (0.0000157) (0.0000157) (0.0000154) 
econfree_i   -0.00216
*
 -0.000676 -0.00106 
   (0.000934) (0.00119) (0.00116) 
lnrgdppc    -0.00207
*
 -0.00178 












 (0.00310) (0.00319) (0.00688) (0.00808) (0.00830) 
Year No No No No Yes 
N 1178 1168 1151 1150 1150 
R
2





Table 4.3.1: Model 1.3.1: Domestic Investment_Robustness Check 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 











bank_crisis -0.00472 -0.00253 -0.00211 -0.00202 -0.00704 






















  (0.0000321) (0.0000347) (0.0000352) (0.0000371) 
econfree_i   0.00278 0.00314 0.0136
***
 
   (0.00267) (0.00288) (0.00307) 
lnrgdppc    -0.00118 0.0177
**
 










 (0.00107) (0.00220) (0.0180) (0.0469) (0.0606) 
Year No No No No Yes 
N 1178 1168 1151 1150 1150 
R
2






Table 4.4: Model 1.4: FDI 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 fdi_gdp fdi_gdp fdi_gdp fdi_gdp fdi_gdp fdi_gdp 
bank_crisis -0.00272 0.000692 0.00213 0.00159 0.000477 -0.000669 












  (0.0000255) (0.0000303) (0.0000306) (0.0000307) (0.0000315) 







   (0.00167) (0.00174) (0.00222) (0.00227) 
investment_share    0.0377 0.0432 0.0497 
    (0.0255) (0.0257) (0.0259) 
lnrgdppc     0.00285 0.00416
*
 












 (0.00152) (0.00209) (0.0108) (0.0128) (0.0155) (0.0170) 
Year No No No No No Yes 
N 1248 1230 1212 1189 1188 1188 
R
2
 0.000 0.073 0.085 0.094 0.096 0.127 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***















Table 4.5: Model 1.5: FDI_Including The lagged value of FDI 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***






 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 














 (0.0273) (0.0282) (0.0284) (0.0288) (0.0289) (0.0293) 
bank_crisis -0.000877 0.00115 0.00207 0.00161 0.000834 0.000347 












  (0.0000261) (0.0000304) (0.0000307) (0.0000308) (0.0000315) 




 0.00437 0.00280 
   (0.00169) (0.00177) (0.00225) (0.00230) 
investment_ 
share 
   0.0278 0.0315 0.0334 
    (0.0254) (0.0256) (0.0259) 
lnrgdppc     0.00187 0.00279 












 (0.00173) (0.00213) (0.0109) (0.0130) (0.0156) (0.0168) 
Year No No No No No Yes 
N 1188 1178 1161 1139 1138 1138 
R
2





Table 4.6: Model 1.6: : FDI_Including The lagged value of Banking Crisis 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***




 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 














 (0.0273) (0.0282) (0.0284) (0.0288) (0.0289) (0.0293) 
bank_crisis 0.00438 0.00526 0.00563 0.00510 0.00437 0.00267 
 (0.00601) (0.00600) (0.00608) (0.00627) (0.00632) (0.00659) 
L.bank_crisis -0.00757 -0.00594 -0.00521 -0.00516 -0.00524 -0.00340 












  (0.0000261) (0.0000304) (0.0000307) (0.0000308) (0.0000315) 




 0.00419 0.00269 
   (0.00170) (0.00178) (0.00226) (0.00231) 
investment_ 
share 
   0.0257 0.0293 0.0324 
    (0.0256) (0.0258) (0.0260) 
lnrgdppc     0.00190 0.00281 












 (0.00174) (0.00214) (0.0110) (0.0132) (0.0157) (0.0168) 
Year No No No No No Yes 
N 1188 1178 1161 1139 1138 1138 
R
2






Table 4.6.1: Model 1.6.1: FDI_Robustness Check 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 




0.00355 0.00517 0.00504 0.00480 0.00132 
 (0.00544) (0.00544) (0.00551) (0.00567) (0.00568) (0.00591) 
L.bank_crisis -0.00323 -0.00275 -0.000935 -0.00137 -0.00132 0.000135 












  (0.0000405) (0.0000434) (0.0000444) (0.0000451) (0.0000497) 







   (0.00319) (0.00336) (0.00369) (0.00408) 
investment_share    0.0141 0.0151 0.0330 
    (0.0380) (0.0380) (0.0398) 
lnrgdppc     0.00449 -0.00350 









 -0.109 0.00105 
 (0.00134) (0.00272) (0.0213) (0.0238) (0.0653) (0.0891) 
Year No No No No No Yes 
N 1189 1179 1162 1140 1139 1139 
R
2
 0.001 0.039 0.050 0.054 0.055 0.093 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
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